Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement

DOI10.1007/s00291-020-00597-7zbMath1456.90096OpenAlexW3044331085MaRDI QIDQ2215560

Stefan Waldherr, Martin Bichler, Richard Littmann, Zhen Hao

Publication date: 13 December 2020

Published in: OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-020-00597-7

zbMATH Keywords

Steiner tree problemapproximation mechanismdeferred-acceptance auctionnetwork procurement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)

Uses Software

• SteinLib
• GitHub

Cites Work

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