Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.08.006zbMath1452.91226OpenAlexW3033851773MaRDI QIDQ2212748

Adam Chi Leung Wong, Artyom A. Shneyerov

Publication date: 24 November 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.006

zbMATH Keywords

convergence to perfect competitiondynamic matching and bargainingaggregate uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Cites Work

• Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result
• The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: can it be good for efficiency?
• An optimistic search equilibrium
• Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate
• The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms
• Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
• Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: A pairwise meetings market with private values.
• Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information
• A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States
• Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings
• Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition
• Information Percolation With Equilibrium Search Dynamics
• Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
• Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• Learning and Price Discovery in a Search Market

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