Price of anarchy and price of stability in multi-agent project scheduling

DOI10.1007/s10479-019-03235-wzbMath1429.90021MaRDI QIDQ2288992

Cyril Briand, Alessandro Agnetis, Přemysl Šucha, Sandra Ulrich Ngueveu

Publication date: 20 January 2020

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03235-w

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibria; price of anarchy; price of stability; flow networks; multi-agent project scheduling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

90B35: Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research

Uses Software

• RanGen

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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