Contractually stable networks

DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0356-4zbMath1269.91021OpenAlexW2150736298MaRDI QIDQ2376073

Jean-François Caulier, Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Publication date: 26 June 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0356-4

zbMATH Keywords

networkscoalition structuresstrong efficiencycontractual stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Games involving graphs (91A43) Applications of game theory (91A80) Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items (9)

Coalition-proof stable networks ⋮ Structural holes in social networks with exogenous cliques ⋮ Listen before you link: optimal monitoring rules for communication networks ⋮ Constitutions and groups ⋮ Paths to stability for overlapping group structures ⋮ Allocation rules for coalitional network games ⋮ Limited farsightedness in R\&D network formation ⋮ Stable and efficient coalitional networks ⋮ Impact of utilities on the structures of stable networks with ordered group partitioning

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