Contractually stable networks
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2376073
DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0356-4zbMath1269.91021OpenAlexW2150736298MaRDI QIDQ2376073
Jean-François Caulier, Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
Publication date: 26 June 2013
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0356-4
Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Games involving graphs (91A43) Applications of game theory (91A80) Group preferences (91B10)
Related Items (9)
Coalition-proof stable networks ⋮ Structural holes in social networks with exogenous cliques ⋮ Listen before you link: optimal monitoring rules for communication networks ⋮ Constitutions and groups ⋮ Paths to stability for overlapping group structures ⋮ Allocation rules for coalitional network games ⋮ Limited farsightedness in R\&D network formation ⋮ Stable and efficient coalitional networks ⋮ Impact of utilities on the structures of stable networks with ordered group partitioning
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Stable networks
- Networks and farsighted stability
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
- Strongly stable networks
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
This page was built for publication: Contractually stable networks