Ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism in adverse selection models

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.004zbMath1400.91177OpenAlexW2253356412MaRDI QIDQ2402059

Lionel Thomas, Raphaël Giraud

Publication date: 6 September 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.004

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral economicsambiguityambiguity aversionadverse selectionnon-expected utility modelsNEO-additive model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

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