Myopic versus far-sighted behaviors in dynamic supply chain coordination through advertising with reference price effect

DOI10.1155/2017/9759561zbMath1370.90134OpenAlexW2616079165WikidataQ59143363 ScholiaQ59143363MaRDI QIDQ2403865

Yafei Zu, Lianghua Chen

Publication date: 12 September 2017

Published in: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2017/9759561

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Related Items (3)

The Stackelberg Games of Water Extraction with Myopic Agents ⋮ Joint emission reduction dynamic optimization and coordination in the supply chain considering fairness concern and reference low-carbon effect ⋮ Myopic versus farsighted behaviors in a low-carbon supply chain with reference emission effects

Cites Work

• Dual role of price and myopia in a marketing channel
• Optimal control and differential games. Essays in honour of Steffen Jørgensen. Workshop held in September 2002.
• Could myopic pricing be a strategic choice in marketing channels? A game theoretic analysis
• Advertising, brand loyalty and pricing
• Coordinating advertising and pricing in a manufacturer-retailer channel
• Retail promotions with negative brand image effects: Is cooperation possible?
• Price coordination in distribution channels: a dynamic perspective
• Dynamic Pricing with Loss-Averse Consumers and Peak-End Anchoring
• A dynamic advertising model with reference price effect
• Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects
• Explicit Solutions of Optimization Models and Differential Games with Nonsmooth (Asymmetric) Reference-Price Effects

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