Bribery in voting with CP-nets
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Publication:2436697
DOI10.1007/s10472-013-9330-5zbMath1282.91095MaRDI QIDQ2436697
Francesca Rossi, Maria Silvia Pini, Nicholas Mattei, Kristen Brent Venable
Publication date: 25 February 2014
Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-013-9330-5
68Q25: Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity
91B12: Voting theory
91B10: Group preferences
91B14: Social choice
Related Items
How hard is safe bribery?, On the hardness of bribery variants in voting with CP-nets, Expressive efficiency of two kinds of specific CP-nets, Frugal bribery in voting, On the complexity of bribery with distance restrictions, Local distance constrained bribery in voting, Complexity results for preference aggregation over (\(m\))CP-nets: Pareto and majority voting, Often Harder than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets
Uses Software
Cites Work
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