On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in games with private information: a complete characterization

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.12.005zbMath1284.91022OpenAlexW2082422712MaRDI QIDQ2441223

M. Ali Khan, Yong-Chao Zhang

Publication date: 24 March 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.12.005

zbMATH Keywords

saturated probability spaceprivate information gamespure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (7)

Pareto refinements of pure-strategy equilibria in games with public and private information ⋮ On the approximate purification of mixed strategies in games with infinite action sets ⋮ On Hurwicz-Nash equilibria of non-Bayesian games under incomplete information ⋮ Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms ⋮ Existence of pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games: a sharpened necessity result ⋮ On pure-strategy equilibria in games with correlated information ⋮ Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games

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