Bargaining with history-dependent preferences

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.004zbMath1281.91092OpenAlexW2079655053MaRDI QIDQ2455681

Duozhe Li

Publication date: 26 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.004

zbMATH Keywords

delaybargaininghistory-dependencegradualism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (12)

Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence ⋮ Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining ⋮ Truncated leximin solutions ⋮ WAGE NEGOTIATION UNDER GOOD FAITH BARGAINING ⋮ Commitment in alternating offers bargaining ⋮ Repeated bargaining with reference-dependent preferences ⋮ Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments ⋮ Bargaining with revoking costs ⋮ Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion ⋮ Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity ⋮ Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining game with loss aversion

Cites Work

• A game-theoretic analysis of bargaining with reputations
• Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
• Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents.
• Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game
• A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-based Choice in Extensive-form Games

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