On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2463791
DOI10.1007/s10058-007-0028-1zbMath1136.91376OpenAlexW2085950285WikidataQ57359948 ScholiaQ57359948MaRDI QIDQ2463791
Michael R. Fellows, Robin Christian, Frances A. Rosamond, Arkadii M. Slinko
Publication date: 6 December 2007
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1959.13/29767
Related Items (20)
On the hardness of bribery variants in voting with CP-nets ⋮ Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting ⋮ The complexity of probabilistic lobbying ⋮ Parameterized complexity of control by voter selection in Maximin, Copeland, Borda, Bucklin, and Approval election systems ⋮ Complexity of control in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules ⋮ Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules ⋮ Parameterized Computational Complexity of Dodgson and Young Elections ⋮ Complexity of manipulation and bribery in premise-based judgment aggregation with simple formulas ⋮ Bribery in voting with CP-nets ⋮ Turbo-Charging Dominating Set with an FPT Subroutine: Further Improvements and Experimental Analysis ⋮ Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election ⋮ Voting Procedures, Complexity of ⋮ On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda ⋮ Approximation and hardness of shift-Bribery ⋮ Multivariate complexity analysis of Swap Bribery ⋮ Parameterized computational complexity of Dodgson and Young elections ⋮ Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Swap Bribery ⋮ Fixed-parameter algorithms for Kemeny rankings ⋮ Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems ⋮ Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- The complexity of Kemeny elections
- Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
- Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
- Recognizing majority-rule equilibrium in spatial voting games
- How hard is it to control an election?
- Exact complexity of the winner problem for Young elections
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
- New directions in cryptography
- Exact analysis of Dodgson elections
- A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems
This page was built for publication: On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda