Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence

DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0223-XzbMath1134.91020OpenAlexW2146446356MaRDI QIDQ2472438

Mikhael Shor, Vlad Mares

Publication date: 22 February 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0223-x

zbMATH Keywords

informationcommon value auctionsindustry concentrationjoint bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Effects of competition in first-price auctions ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Information concentration in common value environments ⋮ Information revelation in competitive markets ⋮ Premium auctions in the field ⋮ Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values

Cites Work

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• Recombinant estimation for normal-form games, with applications to auctions and bargaining
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Uniform conditional variability ordering of probability distributions
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement
• Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
• The Affiliation Effect in First-Price Auctions

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