Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards

DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0626-5zbMath1096.91014OpenAlexW2161002447MaRDI QIDQ2494020

M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0626-5

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designMaskin monotonicityno veto power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (14)

A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction ⋮ On the implementation of the median ⋮ Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima ⋮ Implementation via mechanisms with transfers ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Nash implementation without no-veto power ⋮ Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium ⋮ A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions ⋮ A solution to the two-person implementation problem ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo ⋮ Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences ⋮ Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges ⋮ Time and Nash implementation

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