An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.04.004zbMath1094.91023MaRDI QIDQ2569386

Marilda Sotomayor

Publication date: 27 October 2005

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

core; Shapley-Scarf economy; Pareto optimal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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Cites Work

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• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Restricted housewapping games
• Implementation in generalized matching problems
• On cores and indivisibility
• Kidney Exchange
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods