On the Stable Matchings That Can Be Reached When the Agents Go Marching in One By One

DOI10.1137/140996690zbMath1353.68211OpenAlexW2548768546MaRDI QIDQ2832573

Christine T. Cheng

Publication date: 11 November 2016

Published in: SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/140996690

zbMATH Keywords

reachabilitystable matchingsrandom order mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Combinatorics in computer science (68R05) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (3)

Locally Stable Marriage with Strict Preferences ⋮ Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints ⋮ Stable secretaries

Cites Work

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• Uncoordinated Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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