Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms

DOI10.1007/BF01416005zbMath0794.90031OpenAlexW2112577869MaRDI QIDQ3135911

Ton Storcken, Hans van der Stel, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 21 September 1993

Published in: [https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/entity/Q3031760 ZOR Zeitschrift f�r Operations Research Methods and Models of Operations Research] (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01416005

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnesscompromise pointgeneralized location problemsmedian solutionsPareto optimal, strategy-proof and anonymous solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Continuous location (90B85) Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization ⋮ Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting ⋮ Voting on multiple issues: What to put on the ballot? ⋮ Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms ⋮ Aggregation over Metric Spaces: Proposing and Voting in Elections, Budgeting, and Legislation ⋮ Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms

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