Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-93980-1_11zbMath1209.91046OpenAlexW1876382026MaRDI QIDQ3602835

Tobias Harks

Publication date: 12 February 2009

Published in: Approximation and Online Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-93980-1_11

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Distributed systems (68M14)

Related Items (4)

Resilience of Routing in Parallel Link Networks ⋮ Collusion in Atomic Splittable Routing Games ⋮ “Beat-Your-Rival” Routing Games ⋮ Balancing Load via Small Coalitions in Selfish Ring Routing Games

Cites Work

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• Network Games with Atomic Players
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• Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
• Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
• Traffic assignment problem for a general network
• Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
• Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
• The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology

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