The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem

DOI10.2307/2297391zbMath0639.90011OpenAlexW2152411753MaRDI QIDQ3780708

James M. Malcomson, Frans Spinnewyn

Publication date: 1988

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297391

zbMATH Keywords

long-term contractsmoral hazardincentivesrisk sharingrepeated principal-agent modelsshort-term contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical systems (93A13) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economic growth models (91B62)

Related Items (13)

Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion ⋮ Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment ⋮ The principal-agent model in venture investment based on fairness preference ⋮ Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit? ⋮ Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: a laboratory experiment ⋮ Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships ⋮ Principal-Agent Models ⋮ Efficiency and equity in dynamic principal-agent problems ⋮ Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats ⋮ Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts ⋮ The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency ⋮ The principal-agent problem with adaptive players ⋮ The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields

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