Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00041zbMath0910.90116MaRDI QIDQ3839957

Christopher N. Avery

Publication date: 19 April 1999

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

English auctionssecond-price auctionsequilibria of sequential bidjump bidding strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Emerging multiple issue e-auctions ⋮ Creating a winner's curse via jump bids ⋮ Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases ⋮ On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly ⋮ Asymmetric English auctions. ⋮ Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions ⋮ Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction ⋮ Signaling through entry in auctions with sequential and costly participation ⋮ Compulsory license threats in a signaling game of drug procurement ⋮ Bidding frictions in ascending auctions ⋮ Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket ⋮ The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions ⋮ EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON ENGLISH AUCTIONS: ORAL OUTCRY VERSUS CLOCK ⋮ Coordination in auctions with entry ⋮ A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction ⋮ Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case

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