Cycles and Instability in a Rock-Paper-Scissors Population Game: A Continuous Time Experiment

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDT023zbMath1405.91092OpenAlexW2134053434WikidataQ56431155 ScholiaQ56431155MaRDI QIDQ4610636

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Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/29724/1/rps-continuous.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

learningcyclesexperimentscontinuous timemixed equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90)

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