Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem

DOI10.2307/2951632zbMath0834.90146OpenAlexW1491244361MaRDI QIDQ4836509

Lones Smith

Publication date: 1 April 1996

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63950

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumperfect folk theorem\(n\)-player normal form game\(T\)-fold repeated gamerecursively distinct Nash payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (12)

Finitely repeated games with monitoring options ⋮ On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting ⋮ Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter? ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ Dismissals and quits in repeated games ⋮ A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games ⋮ A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting ⋮ Finitely repeated games: a generalized Nash folk theorem ⋮ Perturbed finitely repeated games ⋮ The role of commitment in repeated games ⋮ A folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon ⋮ Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.

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