Two-Stage Invest–Defend Game: Balancing Strategic and Operational Decisions

DOI10.1287/DECA.2018.0377zbMath1441.90077OpenAlexW2920950522WikidataQ128246029 ScholiaQ128246029MaRDI QIDQ5121285

Melike Baykal-Gürsoy, Abdolmajid Yolmeh

Publication date: 14 September 2020

Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2018.0377

zbMATH Keywords

budget constraintsequential gametwo-stage gamesimultaneous gamestrategic decision makinginfrastructure security gamesterrorism and counterterrorism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

Related Items (4)

A decomposable resource allocation model with generalized overarching protections ⋮ Independent research and development or technology mergers and acquisitions? Decision mechanisms of research and development strategies in a two-stage game ⋮ Skills, Efficiency, and Timing in a Simple Attack and Defense Model ⋮ Stochastic Superiority Equilibrium in Game Theory

Uses Software

• IRIS

Cites Work

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• Target-Hardening Decisions Based on Uncertain Multiattribute Terrorist Utility
• Modeling Credible Retaliation Threats in Deterring the Smuggling of Nuclear Weapons Using Partial Inspection—A Three-Stage Game
• Modeling a Multitarget Attacker–Defender Game with Budget Constraints
• A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem*

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