A GAME THEORETIC FOUNDATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH ADVERSE SELECTION

DOI10.1111/iere.12054zbMath1294.91035OpenAlexW2144874596MaRDI QIDQ5420146

Nick Netzer, Florian Scheuer

Publication date: 11 June 2014

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18471.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (13)

An incentive efficient market for mechanisms in large Akerlof economies ⋮ Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion ⋮ Nash equilibrium in competitive insurance ⋮ Price caps and efficiency in markets with adverse selection ⋮ Financial maintenance covenants in bank loans ⋮ A leverage-based model of speculative bubbles ⋮ On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information ⋮ An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection ⋮ Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection ⋮ (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem ⋮ INCENTIVE EFFICIENT PRICE SYSTEMS IN LARGE INSURANCE ECONOMIES WITH ADVERSE SELECTION ⋮ Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection ⋮ Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search

Cites Work

• On Rothschild-Stiglitz as competitive pooling
• General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection
• The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
• A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
• Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
• A law of large numbers for large economies
• A scent of lemon -- seller meets buyer with a noisy quality observation
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium
• General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications
• Market Equilibrium with Hidden Knowledge and Self-Selection
• Informational Equilibrium
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• A Walrasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection
• Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered

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