scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5240213

Publication date: 22 February 2008

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

allocating divisible goods allocating individuel goods approval voting in practise and theory multiple elections selecting governing coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01)

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