Publication:5444155
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zbMath1151.91001MaRDI QIDQ5444155
Publication date: 22 February 2008
allocating divisible goods; allocating individuel goods; approval voting in practise and theory; multiple elections selecting governing coalitions
91B12: Voting theory
91-01: Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance
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