Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

DOI10.1145/3055399.3055407zbMath1497.91015arXiv1608.06580OpenAlexW3046976141MaRDI QIDQ2155907

Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein

Publication date: 15 July 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior, Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.06580

zbMATH Keywords

convergence ratecommunication complexityapproximate Nash equilibriauncoupled dynamicsconvergence rate of uncoupled dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Modes of computation (nondeterministic, parallel, interactive, probabilistic, etc.) (68Q10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Related Items (14)

Deterministic Communication vs. Partition Number ⋮ The communication complexity of graphical games on grid graphs ⋮ Learning convex partitions and computing game-theoretic equilibria from best response queries ⋮ Query-to-Communication Lifting for BPP ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Distributed methods for computing approximate equilibria ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ On the existence of Pareto efficient and envy-free allocations ⋮ The complexity of the parity argument with potential ⋮ Deciphering chaos in evolutionary games ⋮ Adventures in monotone complexity and TFNP ⋮ Near-Optimal Communication Lower Bounds for Approximate Nash Equilibria ⋮ Near-Optimal Communication Lower Bounds for Approximate Nash Equilibria ⋮ Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games

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