Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks

DOI10.1007/S10203-023-00386-1zbMath1518.91123OpenAlexW4319869050MaRDI QIDQ6098176

Stéphane Villeneuve, Jessica Martin

Publication date: 12 June 2023

Published in: Decisions in Economics and Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-023-00386-1

zbMATH Keywords

Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equationsrisk-sharingprincipal-agent problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Risk models (general) (91B05) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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