Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.08.008zbMath1530.91059OpenAlexW4385988126MaRDI QIDQ6148383

Atsushi Kawamoto, Jens Starke, Rainer Berkemer

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.008

zbMATH Keywords

learningnonlinear dynamicsevolutionary game theorysocial dilemmabest experienced payoff dynamicsselection processes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Sampling dynamics of a symmetric ultimatum game
• Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players
• Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics
• Stable sampling in repeated games
• An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
• Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
• Stability of pure strategy sampling equilibria
• Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
• Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game

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