(A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2022.104587zbMath1518.91067OpenAlexW4312083861MaRDI QIDQ6164813

Kirill Chernomaz, Johanna M. M. Goertz

Publication date: 4 July 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104587

zbMATH Keywords

adaptive learningcommitteesvotinggenetic algorithmasymmetric equilibriaCondorcet jury theoremagent-based simulationssimple plurality rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social learning (91D15)

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