Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints
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Publication:6176747
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.07.005zbMath1521.91248OpenAlexW4384564619MaRDI QIDQ6176747
Mengling Li, Yohanes E. Riyanto, Menghan Xu
Publication date: 23 August 2023
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.005
Matching models (91B68) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)
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