Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control

DOI10.2307/2951644MaRDI QIDQ4286286zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ching-to Albert Ma, Michael Manove

Publication date 27 April 1994

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/f597e8269a51198f0d1bd68cb8b81c85e3bde929

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingbargaining deadlinecheap talkcontinuous-time gamessymmetric Markov perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cited in

(23)

• Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game.
• A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution
• Dynamic coordination games
• The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management
• Alternating-offers bargaining with one-sided uncertain deadlines: an efficient algorithm
• Modelling negotiated decision making in environmental and natural resource management: a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model with uncertainty
• A theory of search with deadlines and uncertain recall
• Self-control and bargaining
• BARGAINING WITH COMMITMENT UNDER AN UNCERTAIN DEADLINE
• A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems
• Optimal deadlines for agreements
• Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
• Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines
• DEADLINE EFFECTS IN SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING — AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
• Collective hold‐up
• The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting
• The deadline effect
• Political brinkmanship and compromise
• Bargaining with incomplete information
• Finite horizon bargaining with outside options and threat points
• Holdup and innovation
• Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
• Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining

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