Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90067-9MaRDI QIDQ1245060zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Peter Fishburn, William V. Gehrlein

Publication date 1977

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90067-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
• Formal Structure of Majority Decision
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• INTERSECTION THEOREMS FOR SYSTEMS OF FINITE SETS
• On Collective Rationality and a Generalized Impossibility Theorem
• Social Choice Functions
• Social choice and individual values
• The Existence of Social Welfare Functions
• The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution

Cited in

(11)

• Resolute majority rules
• Evaluation of some weighted majority decision rules under dependent voting
• Performance evaluation of some special classes of weighted majority rules
• Partial information on decisional competences and the desirability of the expert rule in uncertain dichotomous choice situations
• Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
• The network of weighted majority rules and weighted majority games
• Comparison of the polar decision rules for various types of distributions
• Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
• Simple majority voting isn't special
• Between the expert and majority rules
• Collective decision making in hierarchies

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