Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information
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Cites work
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
- Contest architecture
- Contests with multiple rounds
- Contests with rank-order spillovers
- Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
- Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources
- Endogenous price leadership
- Endogenous sequencing of firm decisions
- Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models
- Endogenous timing in two-player games: A counterexample
- Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
- First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
- First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information
- Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games
- Market Structure and Innovation
- On the Origins of Property Rights: Conflict and Productionin the State of Nature
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
- Optimal sequential contests
- Price Leadership
- Second mover disadvantages in a three-player Stackelberg game with private information
- Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly
- Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants
- Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium
- The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
- The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly
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