Contraction consistent aggregation on trees

DOI10.1007/S11238-025-10044-0MaRDI QIDQ6898916zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Mihir Bhattacharya

Publication date 17 November 2025

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S11238-025-10044-0

zbMATH Keywords

treessingle-peaked preferencescontraction consistencysocial choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Tops-only domains
• Unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic rules for single-peaked preference profiles on graphs

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