Double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00047-5MaRDI QIDQ1590140zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Guoqiang Tian

Publication date 11 March 2004

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00047-5

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionequilibriumLindahl equilibriumlinear cost share equilibriummarketNash allocationRatio equilibriumWalrasian allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Review text

The referred paper deals with the market equilibrium model in the situations in which the coalition patterns, preferences and endowments are unknown to the designer. The main result is represented by a feasible and continuous mechanism of double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium. Its allocations coinside with Nash allocations and strong Nash allocations. It is also shown that this mechanism includes the double implementation of Lindahl equilibrium, ratio equilibrium, Walrasian equilibrium and cost share equilibrium as its special cases. The suggested mechanism represents a ``generic mechanism of double implementation of the competitive-type allocation in private and public economies.

Recommendations

• Implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations
• Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer
• A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
• Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism
• Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations

Cites work

• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• An implementable state-ownership system with general variable returns
• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
• Cost share equilibria: a Lindahlian approach
• Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism
• Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
• Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences
• Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
• Nash-Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with Decreasing Returns to Scale Technologies
• On the constrained Walrasian and Lindahl correspondences
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good
• The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy

Cited in

(3)

• Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer
• Implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations
• Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism

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