Dynamic incentive contracts with controllable risk

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2025.105160MaRDI QIDQ6891723zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yuqian Zhang, Zhaojun Yang

Publication date 2 December 2025

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JEDC.2025.105160

zbMATH Keywords

contract efficiencycontrollable riskfinancial contracting theorymoral hazardrisk-shifting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
• Financial decisions involving credit default swaps over the business cycle
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard
• Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions
• Optimal interest rate rules, asset prices, and credit frictions
• Stochastic integration and \(L^ p-\)theory of semimartingales
• Taxation, agency conflicts, and the choice between callable and convertible debt
• The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility

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