Effective contests

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2009.09.019MaRDI QIDQ846617zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Todd R. Kaplan, Aner Sela

Publication date 9 February 2010

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.09.019

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionscontestsentry costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning
• Contests with Ties
• The optimal allocation of prizes in two-stage contests
• Sequential contests with first and secondary prizes
• The optimal multi-stage contest

Cites work

• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Contest architecture
• The all-pay auction with complete information

Cited in

(9)

• Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest. A mechanism design approach
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
• Foundations for contest success functions
• Contests with endogenous entry
• Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests
• Participation Costs and Inefficiency in Takeover Contests
• Second-price auctions with private entry costs
• Submission costs in risk-taking contests
• Endogenous entry and investment in an all-pay auction

This page was built for publication: Effective contests

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q846617)