High-stakes failures of backward induction

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.07.001MaRDI QIDQ6839139zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Bouke Klein Teeselink, Dennie van Dolder, Martijn J. van den Assem, Jason D. Dana

Publication date 24 March 2026

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2024.07.001

zbMATH Keywords

backward inductionlimited foresightomission biasquantal response equilibriumsubgame perfect Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

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