Implementing equal division with an ultimatum threat
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Recommendations
- Equitable allocation of divisible goods
- Fair division of indivisible items
- How to obtain an equitable optimal fair division
- Fair division with uncertain needs
- Fair (and not so fair) division
- The efficiency of fair division
- On fair division for indivisible items
- Compromising between the proportional and equal division values
- Divide and compromise
Cites work
- A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems
- A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
- An evolutionary model of bargaining
- Divide the dollar: Three solutions and extensions
- Divide-the-dollar game revisited
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207369 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614533 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1015852 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1549895 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2216492 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization
- Mixed-strategy equilibria in the Nash demand game
- On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games
- Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.
- Two-person bargaining: An experimental test of the Nash axioms
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
Cited in
(11)- Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games
- Implementing a surplus division rule
- Reasonable Nash demand games
- Punishing greediness in divide-the-dollar games
- (In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games
- A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium
- Divide-the-dollar game revisited
- Ultimatum bargaining with envy under incomplete information
- Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses
- Using ultimatum power as a leverage in resolving a bargaining conflict
- Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash demand game
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