Informed entry in auctions

DOI10.1007/S00182-017-0583-9MaRDI QIDQ1742145zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Diego Aycinena, Hernán Bejarano, Lucas Rentschler

Publication date 11 April 2018

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsbiddingendogenous entryexperiments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition
• Auctions with entry
• Entry in first-price auctions with signaling
• Auctions with endogenous entry
• Information acquisition and/or bid preparation: a structural analysis of entry and bidding in timber sale auctions

Cites work

• Auction design with opportunity cost
• Auctions with entry
• Coordination in auctions with entry
• Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: theory and evidence from procurement auctions
• Entry coordination in auctions and social welfare: An experimental investigation
• Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
• Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
• Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
• Informed entry in auctions
• Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Nonparametric tests of differences in medians: Comparison of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney and robust rank-order tests
• Optimal auctions revisited
• Participation constraints in the Vickrey auction
• Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences
• Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
• Ranking auctions with risk adverse bidders
• Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
• Revenue equivalence revisited
• Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions
• The effect of entry and information costs on oral versus sealed-bid auctions

Cited in

(4)

• Informed entry in auctions
• Competing first-price and second-price auctions
• Informed intermediaries
• First-price auctions with unobservable entry

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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