Learning to learn, pattern recognition, and Nash equilibrium

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0532MaRDI QIDQ1357407zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Doron Sonsino

Publication date 10 June 1997

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1ae36b7ca59258bcacf16875ea9adebe5b1dc8fa, http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4578.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bounded-rationality, probabilistic learning modelspure strategy Nash equilibriastrategic-form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

Recommendations

• Learning by matching patterns.
• Learning mixed equilibria
• Evolution of beliefs and the Nash equilibrium of normal form games
• A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games

Cites work

• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• Discrete sequence prediction and its applications
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Fictitious play property for games with identical interests
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4060392 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3256930 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3278986 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3069635 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
• Learning mixed equilibria
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Subjective games and equilibria
• Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria

Cited in

(12)

• Learning mixed equilibria
• Strategic pattern recognition -- experimental evidence.
• Learning by matching patterns.
• Evidence for learning to learn behavior in normal form games
• Conditional universal consistency.
• The role of absolute continuity in merging of opinions and rational learning
• Evolution of beliefs and the Nash equilibrium of normal form games
• Exploitable actions of believers in the ``law of small numbers in repeated constant-sum games
• Beyond fictitious play beliefs: incorporating pattern recognition and similarity matching
• Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models
• Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game
• A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games

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