Note on Gale's conjecture in one-sided matching problems

DOI10.1007/S00182-025-00937-3MaRDI QIDQ6982627zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Hidekazu Anno

Publication date 16 May 2025

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00182-025-00937-3

zbMATH Keywords

ex ante efficiencylottery rulematchingstrategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
• Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
• House allocation with existing tenants
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
• On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
• Random assignments with uniform preferences: an impossibility result
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful
• The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching

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