On selecting the right agent

DOI10.3982/TE4027MaRDI QIDQ5164460zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Geoffroy de Clippel, Kfir Eliaz, Daniel Fershtman, Kareen Rozen

Publication date 11 November 2021

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te4027

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic allocation without transfersrepeated games with imperfect monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Applications of game theory (91A80) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Optimal retention in agency problems
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• Learning approximately optimal contracts
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Cited in

(6)

• Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2131728 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1882040 (Why is no real title available?)
• What is sensible for your agents should be sensible for yourself
• Dynamic delegation with a persistent state
• Screening for breakthroughs

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