On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values

DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00883-YMaRDI QIDQ6581890zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kwanghyun Kim

Publication date 1 August 2024

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00182-023-00883-Y

zbMATH Keywords

ex-post Nash equilibriuminterdependent valuesmultilateral trading mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Trade models (91B60)

Recommendations

• Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency
• On incentive compatible, individually rational, and ex post efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
• Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency

Cites work

• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• A dominant strategy double auction
• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
• Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207454 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation with interdependent valuations
• Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
• Robust mechanism design of exchange
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium

This page was built for publication: On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6581890)