Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents

DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0616-8MaRDI QIDQ453206zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francis Bloch, Nicolas Houy

Publication date 18 September 2012

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0616-8

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic mechanism designdynamic assignmentrevenue managementoverlapping generationsdurable objectspromotions and intertemporal assignments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Markovian assignment rules
• Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
• Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
• Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 46153 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3484308 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Sequential Stochastic Assignment Problem
• Analytic solutions of a class of iterative functional differential equations.
• Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
• House allocation with existing tenants
• Markovian assignment rules
• Optimal Sequential Assignments with Random Arrival Times
• Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents
• The dynamics of wealth distribution with asymmetric incentives and endogenous matching

Cited in

(8)

• Markovian assignment rules
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 67283 (Why is no real title available?)
• Quick or cheap? Breaking points in dynamic markets
• Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents
• Elementary results on solutions to the Bellman equation of dynamic programming: existence, uniqueness, and convergence
• Project selection: commitment and competition
• Calendar mechanisms
• Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers

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