Optimal pricing in a dynamic duopoly game model

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This paper considers the optimal pricing of a differential durable good in a duopoly within the framework of a nonzero-sum differential game with fixed duration. The model assumes that the sale rate of a product follows the Bass diffusion process but the rate of imitation is small, so that the demand function for each firm depends only on the firm's own price and the price of the competitor. Each firm maximizes its own discounted integral of profits over the fixed horizon with the cumulated sales of the two firms being the state variables and the prices being the controls. A noncooperative strategy is assumed in which each firm holds the competitor's price as exogenous. The major conclusions of the paper are: (1) If the demand function for each firm i is given by \(\exp (-p_ i)\), where \(p_ i\) is the price charged by firm i, and if the discount rates are zero, then there is a stationary point at which \(p_ 1=p_ 2=2+c\), where c is the (constant) marginal cost of production. Moreover, the optimal pricing strategies are decreasing functions of time. (2) If the demand function for each firm i is given by \((p_ i)^{\epsilon}\), with \(\epsilon >2\), and the discount rates are zero, there is a stationary point at which \(p_ 1=p_ 2=c/(1- 2/\epsilon)\).




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