Parametrized algorithms for random serial dictatorship
From MaRDI portal
Abstract: Voting and assignment are two of the most fundamental settings in social choice theory. For both settings, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-known rule that satisfies anonymity, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness. Recently, it was shown that computing the resulting probabilities is #P-complete both in the voting and assignment setting. In this paper, we study RSD from a parametrized complexity perspective. More specifically, we present efficient algorithms to compute the RSD probabilities under the condition that the number of agent types, alternatives, or objects is bounded.
Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2234775 (Why is no real title available?)
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Fundamentals of parameterized complexity
- Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
- Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
Cited in
(3)
This page was built for publication: Parametrized algorithms for random serial dictatorship
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q477775)