Paths to marriage stability

DOI10.1016/0166-218X(94)00026-AMaRDI QIDQ1902886zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Hernán G. Abeledo, Uriel G. Rothblum

Publication date 26 March 1996

Published in Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218X(94)00026-A

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmblocking pairconvergencematchingstable marriage problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science (68R10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Review text

In the stable marriage problem, one can start with an arbitrary matching and repeatedly adjust it to satisfy a blocking pair (a woman and a man who each prefer the other to their current partner). This need not converge, but it has been shown that judicious choice of the blocking pair to be satisfied leads to convergence. In this paper, the authors examine in some detail the conditions under which the algorithm does converge.

Recommendations

• Stable marriages
• Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
• Stable marriage and indifference
• Stable marriages with forced pairs and forbidden pairs
• A stable marriage requires communication

Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Courtship and linear programming
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets

Cited in

(13)

• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems
• A note on cohabitation and marriage
• A stable marriage requires communication
• The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems
• Random paths to \(P\)-stability in the roommate problem
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5545491 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7626726 (Why is no real title available?)
• From One Stable Marriage to the Next: How Long Is the Way?
• A Stable Marriage Requires Communication
• Stability based on single-agent deviations in additively separable hedonic games
• Tâtonnement in matching markets
• On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal matchings

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