Private Capacities in Mechanism Design

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-03816-7_11MaRDI QIDQ3182917zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano, V. Auletta

Publication date 16 October 2009

Published in Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2009 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03816-7_11

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Distributed systems (68M14) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Algorithmic mechanism design
• Algorithms – ESA 2005
• Incentives in Teams
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Optimal Auction Design
• Private Capacities in Mechanism Design
• Setting lower bounds on truthfulness (extended abstract)
• Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines
• Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

Cited in

(2)

• Private Capacities in Mechanism Design
• Truthful many-to-many assignment with private weights

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