Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.09.001zbMATH Open1296.91141OpenAlexW2058110299MaRDI QIDQ2016246FDOQ2016246

Paul Harrenstein, Vincent Conitzer, Mathijs M. de Weerdt

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnesssocial choice functionindifferencestie-breakingcontract auctionweakly transferable utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Core-selecting package auctions
• Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Stable marriage and indifference
• The core of the matching game
• Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions
• Topics in mathematical economics and game theory. Essays in honor of Robert J. Aumann
• Towards a Mechanism for Incentivating Privacy

Cited In (4)

• Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement
• Dominant strategy mechanisms for contract auctions with risk aversion and moral hazard
• A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents
• Strictly strategy-proof auctions

This page was built for publication: Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2016246)