A dual-channel supply chain problem with resource-utilization penalty: who can benefit from sales effort?
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Publication:2666693
DOI10.3934/jimo.2020097zbMath1476.90067OpenAlexW3028530610MaRDI QIDQ2666693
Jianxin You, Shu-Cherng Fang, Lianxia Zhao
Publication date: 23 November 2021
Published in: Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2020097
Decision theory (91B06) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Marketing, advertising (90B60)
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Cites Work
- Pricing and sales-effort investment under bi-criteria in a supply chain of virtual products involving risk
- Sales effort free riding and coordination with price match and channel rebate
- Prices, promotions, and channel profitability: was the conventional wisdom mistaken?
- When should a manufacturer set its direct price and wholesale price in dual-channel supply chains?
- Coordination of the traditional and the online channels for a short-life-cycle product
- When to introduce an online channel, and offer money back guarantees and personalized pricing?
- Pricing and assortment decisions for a manufacturer selling through dual channels
- Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects
- Direct Marketing, Indirect Profits: A Strategic Analysis of Dual-Channel Supply-Chain Design
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