Reputational bargaining with minimal knowledge of rationality

DOI10.3982/ECTA9865MaRDI QIDQ2859526zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alexander Wolitzky

Publication date 8 November 2013

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9865

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingknowledge of rationalityposturingreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(13)

• Hierarchical experimentation
• No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining
• A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
• Driving a hard bargain is a balancing act: how social preferences constrain the negotiation process
• Sanctions in networks: ``The most unkindest cut of all
• Reputazione e credibilità di una minaccia in un gioco di contrattazione
• Optimal policy with credibility concerns
• Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
• Bargaining under almost complete information
• Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining
• Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
• Reputational bargaining with external resolution opportunities
• Commitment in alternating offers bargaining

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